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The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard
For Electronic and Print Media
By Roscoe L. Barrow*
TE fairness doctrine in broadcasting requires licensees to devote
a reasonable percentage of broadcast time to coverage of public issues
and to present such issues fairly by broadcasting contrasting points of
view.' The United States Supreme Court has adopted a double stand-
ard in the application of this doctrine to broadcasting and print media.
In 1969, the Court held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,2 a case
involving the requirement that broadcasters grant a right of reply to
persons attacked during a broadcast of a controversial issue of public
importance,3 that the fairness doctrine does not violate freedom of
speech or press. In 1974, the Supreme Court held in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo4 that Florida's statute giving political candi-
dates a right of reply to personal attacks by newspapers during political
camlaigns was an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the
pressY Although the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has applied the fairness doctrine to cable television," the free speech
and press issue has not yet arisen as to this medium.
* B.S.A.S., 1935, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D., 1938, Northwestern Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Dean
Emeritus and Wald Professor of Contracts Emeritus, University of Cincinnati. Travel
expense incident to research for this article was granted by the Walter E. Meyer Re-
search Institute of Law.
1. FCC Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372,
26374 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards].
2. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3. The FCC's personal attack rules have been codified. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123,
.300, .598, .679 (1973).
4. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
5. For a perceptive, balanced discussion of the issues involved in Miami Herald,
written before the Supreme Court decided the case, see Traynor, Speech Impediments
and Hurricane Flo: The Implications of a Right-of-Reply to Newspapers, 43 U. Cm.
L. Rpv. 247 (1974).
6. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1973).
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The purpose of this article is to assess the double standard in ap-
plication of the fairness doctrine to the electronic and print media. The
time is propitious for raising anew the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine as applied to broadcasting and for testing the constitutionality
of the fairness doctrine as applied to cable television. Both the emer-
gence of cable television and fear of government domination of the
news media, generated by actions during the Nixon administration
deemed repressive of the media 7 and stimulated by the climate of the
Watergate scandals,8 increase the timeliness of such a reexamination.
The specter of thought control by government instills fear of King John
and induces trust in the media Barons. But a Runnymede is rare. The
people need to know. The question arises whether the people's need
to know will be fulfilled unless this need is converted into a right to
know vis-a-vis King John and the Barons.
The Need of the People to Know
The basic distinction between representative democracy and au-
thoritarian government is that in a democracy social readjustment is
sought through informed consent rather than coercion.9 The Declara-
7. Governmental activities deemed repressive of the media have taken several
forms. Then Vice President Spiro Agnew and other administration spokesmen attacked
the media for bias. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1969, at 88-90. Newspersons were subjected
to selective investigation by federal agencies, and federal suits were brought to require
them to reveal their sources. Hearings on Freedom of the Press Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., at 416-38, 669-780, 988-97 (1971-1972). Newspersons' telephones were tapped.
NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1974, at 26. A taped conversation between President Nixon and
staff members disclosed a threat to encourage challenges to the Washington Post's appli-
cations for renewal of its radio and television station licenses because the Washington
Post had a leading role in reporting the Watergate events. Washington Post, May 9,
1974, at C6, col. 1. In the view of the media, the Office of Telecommunications Policy
(OTP) was politicized and its director, recommended a "carrot and stick" approach to
induce favorable comment by broadcasters on the Nixon administration's performance.
Hearing on Overview of the Office of Telecommunications Policy Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-
2, passim (1973). For an analysis of activities of the OTP affecting the news functions
of broadcasting and cable television, see Barrow, OTP and FCC: Role of the Presidency
and the Independent Agency in Communications, 43 U. QN. L. REv. 291 (1974). For
an incisive discussion of the concerns aroused by governmental activities deemed repres-
sive of the media, see H. ASHMOtRE, FEAR IN Tm AiR-BRoDCASTrINc AND THE Fmsr
AMENDMENT, passim (1973) [hereinafter cited as ASHMORE].
8. Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., passim (1973).
9. Mayo, The Limited Forum-An Analysis of Restrictions on the Discussion of
Public Issues in the Channels of Mass Communication, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 261,
262 (1954).
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tion of Independence evidences the influence on our Constitutional
Fathers of Locke, who viewed people as by nature free and saw -the
bonds of civil society as necessary for their peaceful living together.'0
Hamilton feared that participation in government by the propertyless
masses would undermine the new nation and favored decisionmaking
by an aristocracy." Jefferson, however, believed that the people, if
informed, would make sound decisions.' 2  This latter view has, of
course, prevailed in this country. Freedom and responsibility go hand
in hand. If the people do not participate in decisionmaking, represen-
tative democracy leans toward authoritarianism.
Consensus is necessary to support decisions. The people of the
United States comprise all races, religions, cultures and economic condi-
tions. The pluralistic interests of the American people can be an im-
pediment to consensus on solutions to crucial problems. Enlightened
participation in the decisionmaking process contributes to consensus.
Hence, broad participation in decisionmaking should be encouraged.
Our problems grow more complex and time for decision shortens.
Many question the capacity of the people to contribute to solution of
our problems and favor decisionmaking by an elite. But this road in-
curs the risk that the elite's interest may be furthered at the public's
expense. The secretive decisionmaking during the Nixon administra-
tion which contributed to President Nixon's resignation is a grim re-
minder that decisionmaking by the people is to be trusted beyond that
of an elite.
H. G. Wells observed that "[h]uman history becomes more and
more a race between education and catastrophe."' 3 Since 1920, when
Wells wrote, the race has been accelerated greatly by the nuclear age,
space exploration, the population explosion, the energy crisis, and the
fouling of the environment. Hence, the process of decisionmaking
must be accelerated commensurately. To some this is sufficient reason
to vest decisionmaking in an elite and to leave the people out of the
process of government.
Centralization of communications and denial of access to the
media isolate the individual and discourage his responsible participation
in public affairs. The ordinary citizen's failure to participate in de-
10. J. LOCKE, Two TREATsEs ON GOVERNMENT 348-49 (2d ed. P. Laslett 1967).
11. C. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON-THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AMmuCA 30-33 (1925).
12. Id. at 108.
13. H. WELLS, THE Otrrun E OF HISTORY 1198 (1949).
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cisionmaking results substantially from his inability to inform himself
on the issues. Yet if timely informed, the individual can make a valu-
able contribution to decisions on vital issues. Broadcasting and the
print media have great capacity to inform. Potentially, cable television
has even greater power of communication. In a wired nation, cable
television can provide a forum for local, regional and national "town
meetings."' 4 Innovations in communications technology have thus pro-
vided another opportunity to win the race between education and catas-
trophe. These innovations should be pressed into the service of the
people in order that their need to know may be fulfilled. Informed
by the mass media, the citizenry would be able to participate ade-
quately in self-government.
Although the mass media are capable of providing unbiased infor-
mation, absent regulation this does not necessarily occur. The mass
media are big business. The point of view of media management, with
some exceptions, tends to identify with the wealthy end of the economic
spectrum. It may be in the interest of this group to present one side
of some issues and to neglect coverage of others. Frustration with the
lack of adequate access to the media stimulated the "sit-in," an impro-
vised forum for expression of views on vital issues which had not been
ventilated adequately in the mass media. Tension from failure effec-
tively to communicate in order to find timely solutions to a variety of
social problems contributed to violence in the streets.' 5
Even though the media may desire to report fairly on the perform-
ance of government, they may not be able to do so because government
often acts secretly or discloses only self-serving propaganda. The
"leak" and "scare" tactics have long been used by government to shape
public opinion. The Tonkin Bay Resolution, which gave President
Johnson a basis for escalating the Vietnamese War, was adopted by
Congress on the basis of partial information.' 6 The secret bombing of
Cambodia during the Nixon administration and the former president's
statements relating to the Watergate affair which subsequent disclo-
sures revealed to be inaccurate or incomplete 7 are merely a few ex-
14. The technology for two way cable systems is described in the following
sources. HERMAN W. LAND ASSOCIATES, TELEVISION AND THE WIRED CITY (1968); R.
SMITH, THE WIRED NATION-CABLE TV (1972); Barrow & Manelli, Communications
Technology-A Forecast of Change, (pts. I-H), 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 205, 431
(1969).
15. See Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order (pt. II), 36 U. CQN. L.
REv. 175, 188-89 (1967).
16. TIME, July 30, 1973, at 22; NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1968, at 17-19.
17. President Nixon's contradictory statements regarding his complicity in the
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amples of the government's desire to conceal or color information relat-
ing to vital issues.
An oft-quoted statement by Jefferson is that "[i]f left to me to
decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for a moment
to prefer the latter."' This may be sound. Fortunately, we are not
limited to such an extreme choice. The media should ferret out gov-
ernment concealment and propaganda; government should regulate the
media to the limited degree necessary to assure fulfillment of the
people's need to know without impairing the functions of either govern-
ment or media.19
The impact of the mass media on public opinion is great. Some
say that the greatest effect of the mass media is to reinforce existing
attitudes. 20 However, on new issues where public predisposition is
lacking, the media may have persuasive effect.21 Managers of political
campaigns with good reason allocate the bulk of campaign funds to use
of the mass media z.2  The sharp decline in President Nixon's popularity
and credibility in the wake of the lengthy Senate Watergate hearings
indicates that when the people are informed adequately by the mass
media they do change their attitudes.
The preferred position given to freedom of speech and press
under our constitutional law is a recognition of the paramount impor-
tance to self-government of the free exchange of ideas. Judge
Learned Hand observed:
[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multi-
tude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritarian selection.
cover-up of the Watergate affair have been summarized chronologically. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 19, 1974, at 24-29; Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1974, 'The Nixon
Years," at 12-13.
18. C. BowERs, JEFFERSON AND HAMILToN-THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AiMcA 108 (1925).
19. "'The mere absence of governmental restrictions will not make newspapers and
other instrumentalities of communication play their proper part in the kind of society
we desire." 2 Z. CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUmCATIONS 471 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as CHAFEE]. "A limited right of access to the press can be safely en-
forced." T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 671 (1970).
20. J. KLAPPER, TBE EFFECrS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 38-43 (1960).
21. Id. at 53-61.
22. Recognizing the impact of the mass media on elections, Congress in the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 formerly limited the amount which candidates in
federal elections could spend on use of communications media. 47 U.S.C. § 803 (Supp.
1974). However this provision recently was repealed. BROADCAsTInG, Oct. 21, 1974,
at 46.
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To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon
it our all. 2
3
And Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "[T]he ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas .... [T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... -24 Mr. Justice Holmes's concept of a free trade in ideas
presupposes a market to which there is access. But, just as the builder
of a better mousetrap cannot effectively cry his wares in the modem
industrial market without advertising in the mass media, the individual
with a new idea cannot provide it an opportunity to compete for accept-
ance unless he has access to the mass media.20
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of freedom of
speech and press is to assure "the widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic sources. 26  Chief Justice
Hughes emphasized the importance of maintaining "the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that . . . changes, if desired, may
be obtained by peaceful means.127  Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that
freedom of speech and press may "best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger.128  But the market may be
closed to unpopular ideas, particularly in a medium which seeks com-
patibility between program and advertised product.2 9 Of course, the
mass media cannot accommodate all who may wish to speak or write.
Thus, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn observed that "[w]hat is essen-
tial is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said.""0  At least this measure fulfills the need of the people
to know.
23. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
24. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
25. Professor Jerome Barron describes the free market of ideas concept of free
speech as "romanticism" under modem communications conditions and advocates a con-
stitutional right of access for confrontation of ideas. Barron, Access to the Press-A
New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1678 (1967). Professor Bar-
ron's seminal article has been updated in his recent book. J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM FOR WHOM?].
26. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
27. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
28. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
29. For the influence of the advertising function of broadcasting on programming,
see Barrow, The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REv.
633, 634-44 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Balanced Program Service in Television].
30. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM-THE CONsTrrUTIoNAL PowERs OF THE
PEOPLE 26 (1960).
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Our representative democracy depends upon a multitude of
tongues in the market of ideas to reach sound decisions on vital issues.
The need of the people to know must be fulfilled by the mass media
if the public is to participate in decisionmaking and our representative
democracy is to retain its character as a free society.
The Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting
The advent of chain broadcasting aroused concern that either gov-
ernment or private interests would use this powerful new medium to
control the political process and public opinion. Herbert Hoover, at
the Third Annual Radio Conference in 1924, warned:
[Tihe greatest advance in radio since our last conference is 'the
complete demonstration of -the feasibility of interconnection [of a
chain of radio stations]. It is our duty to consider the possibilities
and potentialities of interconnection .... It would be unfortu-
nate, indeed, if such an important function as the distribution of in-
formation should ever fall into the hands of the Government. It
would be still more unfortunate if its control should come under
the arbitrary power of any person or group of persons. It is incon-
ceivable that such a situation could be allowed to exist .... 31
Congress shared then Commerce Secretary Hoover's concern when it
debated the bill which led to the Radio Act of 1927.82 The statement
of Congressman Johnson is illustrative:
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good
or evil to the American people as the radio. . . . The power of
the press will not be comparable to -that of broadcasting stations
when the industry is fully developed. . . . [I]t will only be a few
years before these broadcasting stations, if operated by chain sta-
tions, will simultaneously .. .bring messages -to the fireside of
nearly every home in America. They can mold and crystallize sen-
timent as no agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong
arm of the law does not prevent monopoly ownership and make
discrimination by such stations illegal, American thought and
American politics will be largely at -the mercy of those who operate
these stations.
33
To guard against undue influence of broadcasting in elections, Con-
31. Address by Herbert Hoover, Third Annual Radio Conference, 1924, quoted in
FCC, OFCE OF NETWORK STUDY, SEcoND INTERI REPORT, Docket No. 12782, at 114
(1965).
32. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
33. 67 Cong. Rec. 5558 (1926). The Supreme Court has observed that, in licens-
ing and regulating broadcasting, "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be subordinated
to monop6listic domination in the broadcasting field." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
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gress required broadcasters to provide opposing political candidates with
equal opportunities to use broadcasting facilities for political purposes.3"
This application of the fairness in broadcasting principle to political
elections is called "the equal opportunities in political broadcasting doc-
trine. 33
Two years after congressional enactment of the rule, the FCC rec-
ognized that this fairness principle "applies not only to addresses by po-
litical candidates but to all discussions of issues of importance to the
public."" Accordingly, the FCC applied the fairness doctrine to
broadcasting, requiring that broadcasters devote reasonable time to
broadcast of controversial issues of public importance and that they al-
locate reasonable time to all sides of such issues.37
The FCC emphasized that the purpose of the fairness doctrine is
to contribute to an informed public opinion. In its 1949 report on Edi-
torializing by Broadcast Licensees, the commission stated:
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass com-
munication in a democracy is the development of an informed pub-
lic opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas con-
cerning the vital public issues of the day. . . . The Commission
has consequently recognized the necessity for licensees to devote
a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation
of news and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion
of public issues of interest in the community served by the particu-
lar station. And we have recognized, with respect to such pro-
grams, the paramount right of the public in a free society to be
informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection
the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning -these vital and
often controversial issues which are held by the various groups
which make up the community. It is the right of the public to be
informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broad-
cast his own particular views on any matter, which is the foundation
stone of the American system of broadcasting. 38
In 1959, Congress, in amending section 315 of the Communications
Act of 1934,"9 ratified the fairness doctrine, which the FCC had de-
34. This provision was enacted as section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1170, and was re-enacted as section 315 in the Communications Act of 1934.
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
35. For an analysis of the equal opportunities in political broadcasting doctrine,
see Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting, 37 U. CIN.
L. REv. 447 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Doctrines in Broadcasting].
36. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. RaP. 32, 33 (1929).
37. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26374.
38. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
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veloped as an implicit element of this public interest standard.40
Freedom of press applies to broadcasting, of course, as well as to
the print media.41 Traditionally, the print media have been free of
governmental regulation, but broadcasting has been distinguished from
the print media on the basis of the limited radio spectrum which
prompted licensing of broadcasters. Thus, in National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States,42 which upheld the FCC's chain broadcasting rules
against attack43 on the ground of freedom of speech and press, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use -the lim-
ited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio in-
herently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some
who wish -to use it must be denied. . . . The right of free speech
does not include . .the right to use the facilities of radio 'without
a license. 44
Under the scarcity concept, reasonable regulation of broadcasting does
not violate freedom of speech or press because the natural characteris-
tics of the radio spectrum limit access. Only those found best qualified
to serve the public interest are granted licenses, and the need of the
people to know is given paramount value in the scale of the public in-
terest.
The Red Lion Case
The fairness doctrine was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court against attack based on freedom of speech and press in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.45 During a broadcast by Red Lion, it was
stated that one Cook had attacked J. Edgar Hoover and smeared Barry
Goldwater. Cook requested time to reply and Red Lion refused to
40. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969). As Con-
gress ratified the fairness doctrine in section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934,
the FCC cannot abandon the doctrine without a further amendment by the Congress.
However, Congress did not ratify every application of the fairness doctrine which the
FCC had made. Thus, query to what extent the FCC can pare down its past applica-
tions of the fairness doctrine without violating the statute?
41. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
42. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
43. The chain broadcasting rules prohibit the licensing of broadcasters who in-
clude in their affiliation contracts with networks provisions which inhibit broadcasters
in their choice of programming to fulfill needs of the community served. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.658 (1973).
44. 319 U.S. at 226-27.
45. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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grant it. Cook then complained to the FCC, which found that Red
Lion had not fulfilled its obligation under the fairness doctrine and
ordered it to provide reply time.4 6  Red Lion appealed.4 7  Mr. Justice
White, writing for the Court, based a finding of the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine on the scarcity of channels:
[T]he resource is one . . . for which there are more immediate
and potential uses than can be accommodated, and for which wise
planning is essential ...
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Govern-
ment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims
of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to
those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regula-
tions and ruling at issue here . . . constitutional. 48
Another rationale for sustaining regulation of broadcasting against
attack on First Amendment grounds is the concept that in broadcasting
there must be an accommodation of the interests of listeners and
viewers, the licensed broadcasters, and a host of parties desiring access
to broadcasting facilities, such as networks, independent program pro-
ducers, syndicators, citizens' groups, and individuals. In 1925, then
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, at the Fourth National Radio
Conference, stated:
We hear a great deal about the freedom of the air; but there are
two parties to freedom of the air, and to freedom of speech, for
that matter. . . . Certainly in radio I believe in freedom for the
listener. He has much less option upon what he can reject, for the
other fellow is occupying his receiving set. The listener's only op-
tion is to abandon his right to use his receiver. Freedom can not
mean a license to every person or corporation who wishes to broad-
46. The broadcaster was ordered to provide the reply time free of charge insofar
as no paid sponsorship was available. This obligation was imposed because otherwise
the broadcaster would leave the public uninformed. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40
F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
47. During the litigation, the FCC, after hearing, adopted regulations applying the
fairness doctrine to personal attacks and political editorials. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300,
1598, .679 (1973). In substance, the rules provide that a person attacked during broad-
cast of a controversial issue has a right of reply, and that if a broadcaster endorses or
opposes a political candidate the disfavored candidate or a spokesman for him has a right
of reply. The Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) brought an ac-
tion challenging the rules on First Amendment grounds. The federal courts of appeals
reached conflicting decisions in the RTNDA and Red Lion cases, the Seventh Circuit
holding in RTNDA that the fairness doctrine, as applied in the personal attack and po-
litical editorial rules, violates freedom of speech and press. Radio Television News Di-
rectors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The two cases were joined in the appeal
to the Supreme Court.
48. 395 U.S. at 399-401.
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cast his name or wares, and thus monopolize the listener's set ...
The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public bene-
fit. The dominant element for consideration in the radio field is,
and always will be, the great body of the listening public. .... 49
Judge Learned Hand, who wrote the opinion in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States0 for the three-judge trial court, was first
to recognize in a judicial decision the interest of the listeners. Judge
Hand was of the view that in broadcasting, where the freedom of
speech and press of many different interests must be accommodated,
the interest of the listeners is paramount. He wrote:
The interests which the [chain broadcasting] regulations seek to
protect are the very interests which the First Amendment itself pro-
tects, i.e. the interests, first, of the "listeners," next, of any licensees
who may prefer to be freer of the "networks" than they are, and
last, of any future competing "networks."'' 1
Later the FCC concurred in this view of the primacy of the interest
of the listeners:
It is this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right
on -the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any indi-
vidual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views
on any matter, which is the foundation stone -of the American
system of broadcasting.
52
In the Red Lion case, Mr. Justice White emphasized the preeminent
interest of the viewers and listeners in applying the First Amendment
to broadcasting:
Mhe people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have -the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market, whether it be by Government itself or a pri-
vate licensee. 53
The Democratic National Committee Case
Some writers maintain not only that the fairness doctrine is in con-
formity with freedom of speech and press, but also that individuals have
49. Address by Herbert Hoover, Fourth National Radio Conference, 1925, quoted
in FCC, OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, Docket No. 12782, at
80 (1965).
50. 47 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
51. Id. at 946.
52. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
53. 395 U.S. at 390 (citation omitted).
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a right of access to broadcasting which is protected by the First Amend-
ment.54 However, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee55 the Supreme Court held that persons desir-
ing to present editorial advertisements via broadcasting do not have a
right of access which is protected by the guarantee of freedom of
speech.
The gist of the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger,
is that, in accommodating the several First Amendment interests in
broadcasting, Congress and the FCC have chosen the fairness doctrine
approach, in which the interest of listeners and viewers is paramount;
insofar as limitations on broadcast time make it difficult to develop a
practical plan for granting access to all individuals and organizations de-
siring access, the FCC's determination that the broadcaster is not re-
quired to grant access in advertising time segments to individuals or or-
ganizations to present editorial advertisements does not violate the free-
dom of speech of those denied such access. However, if the FCC could
devise a practical system for granting access which also accommodates
the several First Amendment interests involved, such a system would
not violate the freedom of the press of licensed broadcasters.
The broadcasting channels are a public domain.5 6 Without con-
travening freedom of speech or press, Congress could have adopted a
regulatory framework for broadcasting under which stations were com-
mon carriers and persons were granted a right to speak on a first-come,
first-served basis; or Congress could have divided broadcasting time on
54. Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the Enforcement of
Discretion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 89; Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the
First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U.
MIcH. J.L. REF. 193 (1972). Professor Barron proposes extending such a right of access
to newspapers. FREEDOM FOR WHOM?, supra note 25.
55. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The FCC had ruled that a broadcaster who had met
his obligation under the fairness doctrine to broadcast public issues was not required to
accept editorial advertisements. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970);
Complaint by Business Executives, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970). A divided court of appeals
reversed in the joined cases, declaring that a flat ban on paid public issue announcements
is a violation of the First Amendment, and remanded the cases to the FCC for the de-
velopment of regulations governing the right of access. Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56. Congress, in the Communications Act of 1934, carefully preserved public own-
ership of the broadcasting channels lest they come under private ownership and the own-
ers control public opinion and the political process. Thus, Congress stated that the pur-
pose of the act is "to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels
. . and to provide for the use of such channels, but not for the ownership thereof."
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). The act requires licensees to waive expressly any right in the
assigned frequency, which is normally granted for a three year term. Id. §§ 304,
307(d), 309 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
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each channel between hours for commercial broadcasting and hours for
noncommercial broadcast of public issues.57  Congress chose a differ-
ent course: it left to the licensed broadcasters "journalistic -freedom
consistent with its public obligations.""8  To assure that broadcasting
would contribute its fair share to fulfillment of the need of the people
to know, Congress required that broadcasters provide equal opportun-
ities in the use of broadcasting facilities for political purposes, allocate
reasonable time to the presentation of public issues, present all sides
of such issues, and develop a balanced program service in the public
interest. 59
While the decision of the Supreme Court in Democratic National
Committee recognized that the FCC in its hearing on the fairness doc-
trinee might prescribe a practical right of access by individuals to
broadcasting which would be in conformity with the freedom of press
of licensed broadcasters, the FCC has not been able to design such a
plan. 1 The commission stated:
Our studies during the course of this inquiry have not disclosed any
scheme of government-dictated access which we consider "both
practicable and desirable." We believe, to the contrary, that the
public's interest in free expression through broadcasting will best
be served and promoted through continued reliance on the fairness
doctrine which leaves questions of access and the specific handling
of public issues to the licensee's journalistic discretion. This system
is far from perfect. However, in our judgment, it does represent
the most appropriate accommodation of the various First Amend-
ment interests involved, and provides for maximum public enlight-
enment on issues of significance with a minimum of governmental
57. The FCC, pursuant to the authority conferred by Congress allocates frequen-
cies to particular uses such as commercial, noncommercial public and educational, mari-
time and aeronautical, government and military, mobile industrial, and citizens' band.
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. 1974). Such classification predetermines the character
of broadcasts and excludes from the assigned frequencies all except the permitted class.
However, as this is a reasonable and necessary system for the effective use of the broad-
casting channels in the overall public interest, such regulation does not contravene free-
dom of speech or press.
58. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
110 (1973).
59. As this article focuses on the fairness doctrine, the two other basic elements
of the broadcaster's responsibility-equal opportunities in use of broadcasting facilities
by political candidates and the ascertainment and fulfillment of the program needs of
the community served-are not extensively discussed. For a more complete treatment
of these additional responsibilities of broadcasters, see Balanced Program Service in
Television, supra note 29; Doctrines in Broadcasting, supra note 35.
60. Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine, 30 F.C.C.2d 26
(1971).
61. Faimess Doctrine and Publi Interest Stgndards, supra note 1, at 26383,
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intrusion into the journalistic process. 62
Despite this contention, a practical right-of-access to broadcasting,
in conformity with freedom of speech and press, can be devised. For
example, Congress or the FCC could provide that a designated
schedule of time periods be set aside for the discussion by citizens of
public issues. The formats might include individual statements, de-
bates, and panel discussions. Since broadcasting cannot accommodate
all who wish to speak, and the need of the people to know is satisfied
if everything worth saying is said, selection of subjects, speakers and
formats would have to be entrusted to some authority. Such selection
should not be entrusted to government, however, due to the danger of
propagandizing. Nor is it necessary to leave the selection to the li-
censed broadcasters. At both the national and local levels such selec-
tion might be vested in a committee of citizens representative of the
community involved. Each cognizable component of the community
could choose through procedures of its preference its representation on
the committee. 3 Whether such a practical right of access to broadcast-
ing is a desirable addition to the fairness doctrine as developed by the
FCC may be questioned by some. It may be argued, however, that
such a committee system would have the merit of being sensitive to
the need of the people to know. Also, it would implement the Su-
preme Court's determination that the interests of listeners and viewers
are paramount among the various competing First Amendment interests
in broadcasting.64
Some spokesmen for the broadcasting industry have long opposed
the application of the fairness doctrine to that field.6 5 Their objections
were renewed during the FCC's recent hearing on the fairness doc-
trine.66 The complaint is that requiring broadcasters to present con-
62. Id.
63. For a proposal along these lines, see Hearings on the Fairness Doctrine Before
the Special Comm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., serv. 90-33, at 89, 92-93 (1968) (statement of Mrs.
Harriet Pilpel, ACLU).
64. In the Democratic National Committee case, Chief Justice Burger was con-
cerned that requiring broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements would favor
the affluent in the determination of issues to be discussed. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 1, 123 (1973). To avoid such undue influ-
ence, the right-of-access should be without charge.
65. Hearings on the Fairness Doctrine Before the Special Comm. on Investigations
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
90-33, at 22-27 (Frank Stanton, CBS); at 39 (Elmer Lower, ABC); at 47-48 (Vincent
T. Waslewski, NAB); at 77-83 (Reuven Frank, NBC); at 110-15 (Vincent T. Waslew-
ski, NAB); at 145-51 (Jay Crouse, RTNDA) (1968).
66. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26374.
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trasting viewpoints67 inhibits broadcast journalism. This contention has
been articulated by former chief justice of the California Supreme
Court Roger J. Traynor, in his inimitable style, as follows:
The new twist in the [Democratic National Committee] case was
the Court's concern over Red Lions, which, because of their own
monstrous size, had been kept in captivity since infancy and now
bleeped more than they roared. There were intimations that
maybe even a firmly regulated old Red Lion should be trusted to
exercise a little more freedom to make it a little more robust. Too
many bleeps in the bellows and a lion loses its tone.68
However, statistics show that only about a tenth of licensed broad-
casters feel inhibited by the fairness doctrine 9 and the objections typi-
cally come from officials of broadcasting organizations. 70  In its recent
report on the fairness doctrine, the FCC stated, relative to the alleged
inhibition of broadcasters by the fairness doctrine:
A number of commentators have argued that, in spite of its -worthy
purposes, the actual effect of the fairness doctrine can only be to
restrict and inhibit broadcast journalism. Far from inhibiting de-
bate, however, we believe that the doctrine has done much to ex-
pand and enrich it.71
The advertising function of broadcasting, not the fairness doctrine,
puts bleeps in the bellows of the broadcasting lions. Commercial
broadcasting is supported by advertising. Network managers, on be-
half of mass-circulation advertisers and advertising agencies, provide
programming which fulfills the advertising needs of mass-consumer-
goods. 72  Entertainment programs are the most successful vehicles for
attracting the largest audiences to hear the advertisements. 7  As one
advertiser put it, "I want happy shows for happy people with happy
problems. '7 4 Programs involving public issues simply do not attract the
maximum audience and do not create an atmosphere which is condu-
67. Some issues may have only two sides but others may involve a broad spectrum
of differing viewpoints. For example, the issue of involvement in the Vietnamese War
engendered at least four viewpoints: acceleration of military activity; holding military
activity to the existing level; phased withdrawal; and immediate withdrawal. Note, The
FCC Fairness Doctrine and Informed Social Choice, 8 HAPV. J. LFais. 333, 351-52
(1971).
68. Traynor, Speech Impediments and Hurricane Flo: The Implications of a
Right-of-Reply to Newspapers, 43 U. CiN. L. Rav. 247, 263 (1974).
69. Doctrines in Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 480-81, 486-87.
70. See note 68 & accompanying text supra.
71. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26374.
72. Balanced Program Service in Television, supra note 29, at 634-44.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 637 n.14, quoting Transcript, Hearings on Study of Radio and Television
Network Broadcasting Before the FCC, Docket No. 12782, 5557, 5588 (1959-1966).
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cive to strong sales impact. Hence, Gresham's Law operates in broad-
casting to drive out programs having significant minority audiences,
such as public affairs programming, and to bring in programs attracting
the maximum number of viewers, such as, in their day, "Gunsmoke"
and "I Love Lucy.
'75
Administration of the Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting
The procedure through which the FCC administers the fairness
doctrine is carefully designed to avoid inhibition of broadcasters' pre-
sentation of public issues.7 6 Broadcasters are not required to present
more than one side of a controversial issue in the same broadcast.
Other points of view may be presented in the broadcaster's overall pro-
gram service. Nor is equal balance of viewpoints required. Decisions
as to the opposing views to be presented, the appropriate spokesmen,
and the format are "left to the licensee's discretion subject only to a
standard of reasonableness and good faith. 7 7  The FCC does not mon-
itor broadcasts for possible violations, and only if the complaining party
makes a prima facie case does the FCC forward the complaint to the
broadcaster for comment.71 In fiscal 1973, the FCC received about
twenty-four hundred complaints of violation of the fairness doctrine, but
only ninety-four of these complaints were forwarded to broadcasters
for comments.7 9 In the rare case in which the FCC finds that a broad-
caster has not lived up to his responsibility under the fairness doctrine,
the licensee is merely asked to provide reasonable time for the oppos-
ing point of view.80
A recent case, National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,8  decided by
a divided federal court of appeals and recently set for rehearing en
banc, indicates that the commission's scope of review of broadcasters'
compliance with the fairness doctrine may be more limited than pre-
viously had been thought. A complaint had been made to the com-
75. Balanced Program Service in Television, supra note 29, at 635.
76. A detailed description of the fairness doctrine and review of the FCC's adju-
dications thereunder do not serve the purpose of this article. Such accounts have been
rendered elsewhere. See H. GELLER, THE FAMRNESS DOCTRINE iN BROADCASTING (1973);
Doctrines in Broadcasting, supra note 35.
77. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26374.
78. Complaints by Federation of Citizens Associations, 21 F.C.C.2d 12 (1969);
Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26374.
79. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26375.
80. Id. at 26378.
81. 31 P & F RADIo REa. 2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1974) rehearing granted, 87 BROAD-
CASTING, Dec. 23, 1974, at 33,
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mission that NBC's documentary, "Pensions: The Broken Promise,"'
presented only one side of a controversial issue: the focus was on pri-
vate pension plans which had failed and the need for reform, but inade-
quate attention was given to successful private pension plans.83 NBC
replied that the subject of the documentary was "some of the problems
involved in some private pension plans" and that these problems were so
well recognized that the documentary did not raise a controversial
issue.84
The standard established by the commission governing broadcast-
ers' compliance with the fairness doctrine is "reasonable, good faith
judgments."85 The FCC decided that the program "did in fact present
viewpoints on one side of the overall performance and proposed regula-
tion of the private pension system," and that this issue was a contro-
versial one, and the commission ordered NBC to comply with the fair-
ness doctrine.8 6 However, the majority of the circuit court decided that
the FCC had committed an error of law in defining the scope of the
issue presented in the documentary differently and more comprehen-
sively than NBC had defined it.8 7 The court deemed the commission's
substitution of its judgment for that of NBC concerning the character
of the issue a departure from the commission's stated standard that
broadcasters must exercise reasonable, good faith judgments. 8   The
court stated that in the sensitive area of broadcast journalism the FCC's
authority is limited to "correcting the licensee for abuse of discretion."
8 9
Having ruled that the commission's error was one of law, the court re-
versed.
In his dissent, Judge Tamm expressed concern that the restriction
on the commission's review of broadcasters' performance under the
fairness doctrine would permit licensees to propagandize listeners and
viewers.90 He observed that a documentary, unlike on-the-spot report-
ing, is well adapted to inclusion of contrasting viewpoints.91 And he
82. The script of the program is included in the opinion as Appendix A. Id. at
597-616.
83. Id. at 556.
84. Id. at 557.
85. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26376,
26378.
86. 31 P & F RADIO RaG. 2d at 551, 558, quoting Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 44 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973).
87. 31P & F ADIo RE. 2d at 570.
88. Id. at 570-71.
89. Id. at 574.
90. Id. at 594-96.
91. Id. at 594.
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emphasized that the journalistic discretion of broadcasters to choose
what may be heard or seen should not outweigh "the right of the people
to know."92
The soundness of the holding in National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
is questionable and a reversal on en banc rehearing would be reason-
able. The commission's determination that under the reasonable,
good faith judgment test NBC should have recognized that the
documentary raised a controversial issue and, thus, should have pre-
sented both sides, appears more appropriately classified as an issue of
mixed fact and law rather than an issue of law.93 The context seems
appropriate for a reviewing court to exercise limited judicial review of
the agency's conclusion rather than to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency. Administrative agencies are entrusted by the Congress
with responsibility for regulation in areas affected by a public interest.94
The head of the agency is assisted by a career staff of experts. The
agency is involved continuously in decisionmaking in a specialized area.
Accordingly, the agency develops expertise in its area of responsibility.
Reviewing courts, on the other hand, are responsible for the full spec-
trum of judicial problems and are not generally assisted by a substantial
staff of experts. This contrast has prompted the Supreme Court to
state: "So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of
the expert body it must stand. . . . The judicial function is exhausted
when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved
by the administrative body.' ,95
Yet, reviewing courts do sometimes substitute judicial judgment
for the administrative agency's judgment in what is clearly a mixed fact
and law context. Professor Kenneth Davis has pointed out the diffi-
culty in extracting the criteria which motivate the reviewing court, on
the one hand, to classify a mixed law and fact context as one of fact
and thus to apply limited judicial review or, on the other hand, to clas-
sify the context as one of law and substitute judicial judgment. 6 What
motivated the court in National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC to substitute
its judgment for that of the commission clearly was concern for freedom
of journalistic discretion from governmental control. Thus, the court
buttressed its position with the Supreme Court's view in the Democratic
National Committee case that Congress had reposed substantial journal-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 596.
94. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.07 (1958).
95. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939) (citations
omitted).
96. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.05 (1958).
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istic discretion in broadcasters.17 The majority opinion states that "the
risks of government interference are so oppressive as to require a plain
showing of journalistic abuse before a government official can issue a
direction that the journalist's report must be supplemented .... -98
Rather than attempting to do in the Red Lion, the court resorted
to extracting some of its teeth. Although the opinion states that no
First Amendment issue is reached,99 it is consideration for journalistic
discretion of the sort which is concerned in freedom of the press cases
that appears to have prompted the reversal. The court turned the pyra-
mid of judicial review of agency action on its apex, limiting the agency's
review of the regulated industry's decisions and substituting judicial
judgment for even this limited role of the agency. Yet, the Supreme
Court's strong protection of journalistic discretion in Democratic Na-
tional Committee augurs possible affirmance in the event of appeal to
the Supreme Court. If the case is sustained, broadcasters will have
even less reason than in the past for asserting that the fairness doctrine
is inhibitory.
During the FCC's recent hearing on the fairness doctrine, some
parties urged that the commission should not consider complaints at the
time they are filed but should review them, together with the broadcast-
er's overall performance, at renewal time. 00 However, the FCC con-
cluded that this procedure would not adequately safeguard the public's
right to be informed. 101 If presentation of the opposing point of view
is delayed until public opinion has crystallized, the fairness doctrine has
no practical effect.' 02
The Case-by-Case Adjudication Policy
In administering the fairness doctrine, the FCC has established
general guidelines and has relied upon case-by-case adjudication rather
than promulgation of extensive regulations.'0 3 The broadcaster is re-
97. 31 P & F RADIoREG. 2d at 563.
98. Id. at 593. (Leventhal, J., supplemental concurring statement).
99. Id. at 558.
100. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26378.
101. Id.
102. Doctrines in Broadcasting, supra note 35, at 493-94.
103. Except for its rules on personal attacks and political editorials (see note 3 su-
pra), the FCC has not issued regulations concerning application of the fairness doctrine.
In 1964, the FCC issued a "primer" compiling significant adjudications on fairness com-
plaints. FCC Public Notice of July 1, 1964, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964). The primer
was reprinted in 1969. 40 F.C.C.2d 598. Another updating has been announced. Fair-
ness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26379 n.18.
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quired to provide a reasonable amount of time for programs on public
issues. Thus the licensee has discretion in the first instance to deter-
mine the amount of time to be so allocated subject only to the test of
reasonableness. 1 4  When a complaint is raised that the broadcaster has
presented only one side of a specific issue, the FCC must make a three-
fold determination: what specific issue has been raised; whether this
is a controversial issue of public importance; and whether the broad-
caster, in his overall programming, has afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity for presentation of contrasting points of view. 105 The FCC has not
developed criteria governing these determinations. 0 6 This policy is in
keeping with the journalistic discretion reposed in the broadcaster.
The fairness doctrine applies to editorial comment in advertise-
ments but does not apply to false or deceptive advertising. 1°7 In
Banzhaf v. FCC,10 8 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the FCC's application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette adver-
tising, based on public health considerations'1° arising out of the sur-
geon general's determination that cigarette smoking is dangerous to
health. The saturation advertising on television depicted smoking as
essential to social prominence, distinction, or sexual attraction. 110
Once hooked, many youths are life-short customers.
In Friends of the Earth v. FCC,"' the same circuit court held that
the fairness doctrine could not logically be limited to cigarette advertis-
ing and that it might well apply to advertisement of high-powered auto-
mobiles and leaded gasoline. Nevertheless, in its recent report on the
fairness doctrine the FCC concluded that cigarette advertising was a
special health case and that the fairness doctrine should not otherwise
hereafter apply to product advertising.-" However, if a broadcaster
104. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26375.
105. Id. at 26376-78.
106. Query whether broadcasters in small communities who typically lack substan-
tial managerial staffs would be aided in complying with the fairness doctrine by the es-
tablishment of such criteria? For an incisive study of criteria for selecting issues which
merit public airing, see Mayo, The Free Forum-Development of a Democratic Forum
in the Limited Media of Mass Communications, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 387 (1954).
107. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26380-82.
108. Complaint to WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, stay & reconsideration denied, 9
F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
109. WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967).
110. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND AD-
VERTISING AcT, 113 Cong. Rec. 2045, 2047-48 (1967).
111. 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
112. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26382. The
FTC had proposed a right of access to respond to product advertising. Id.
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accepts a product advertisement having editorial comment on a public
issue, the fairness doctrine applies to the public issue.11 3 In light of
this policy and the Supreme Court's decision that there is no First
Amendment right of access to broadcasting to present editorial adver-
tisements," 4 advertisements containing editorial comment may be re-
jected by broadcasters.
Perhaps the most sensitive aspect of the fairness doctrine is accu-
racy of news reporting. As the news services of the three major tele-
vision networks are the principal news source for most Americans, mis-
statement or suppression of the facts or essential elements of public is-
sues could leave the public largely misinformed or uninformed. The
network news services have been highly responsible in reporting the
news. However, charges of slanting the news and falsification of facts
are common."15 The director of the Office of Telecommunications Pol-
icy, who is adviser to the president on communications, has recom-
mended measures to exclude from news reporting alleged "ideological
plugola," "elitist gossip," and "imbalance or consistent bias from the
networks."" 6
Government must not be permitted to look over the shoulder of
a news reporter as he writes his story, or to compare his first draft with
his final product, or to inquire into those thoughts which occurred to
the reporter's mind but, in the exercise of journalistic discretion, were
omitted from the story. Such governmental supervision of journalism
would strangle freedom of the press. Thus, when a congressional com-
mittee investigated charges that CBS had deleted and rearranged ma-
terials in its documentary "The Selling of the Pentagon" so as to create
a false impression"'7 the committee subpoenaed the film's omissions.
However, the House very appropriately refused to issue a contempt ci-
tation against CBS president Frank Stanton for failure to comply with
the subpoena.
The FCC has also refused to engage in any such supervision of
broadcast journalism. In its recent report on the fairness doctrine, the
FCC adhered to its prior policy of refusing to investigate charges of
misrepresentation of the news unless, on the face of the evidence sub-
113. Id. at 26380.
114. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
115. See note 7 supra.
116. Address by Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunication
Policy in Indianapolis, Ind., Dec. 18, 1972.
117. H.R, Rpp, NQ. 92- 49, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
January 19751
mitted, there is substantial indication of "deliberate distortion."'1 s
The Argument for Abandoning the Fairness Doctrine
A respected segment of opinion continues to urge that the fairness
doctrine should be abandoned. A conference conducted in 1973 by
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions recommended that
in lieu of the fairness doctrine, freedom and responsibility in broadcast
journalism should be sought through the private National News Coun-
cil.119 The council, whose founding chairman was Roger J. Traynor,
the retired chief justice of the Supreme Court of California, has ren-
dered significant service but has obvious limitations. The council hears
complaints by and against the media; however, it lacks subpoena power
and must depend upon cooperation. Some major newspapers, deeming
the council an unwarranted intrusion into journalism, have refused this
needed cooperation. Particularly in broadcasting, where the impact of
the advertising function on programming is great and the political proc-
ess has its major forum, it is unlikely that a council of private citizens
can assure equal opportunity in use of broadcasting for campaign pur-
poses, fairness in the presentation of all sides of vital issues, and fulfill-
ment of the community's program needs. The council is a useful ad-
junct to the fairness doctrine but should not and could not supplant it.
In 1973 another conference, convened by the American Trial
Lawyers Foundation, concluded that all regulation of broadcasting pro-
gram service, 2 0 including the fairness doctrine, should be aban-
doned.'21 The majority at the conference took the position that:
[t]he right of free expression [via broadcasting] is that of the sta-
tion owners, who are licensed to use the airwaves as newspaper
publishers receive special permits for reduced rate use of the
mails. 12
2
Such a contention is diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court's es-
tablished principle that, in the accommodation of First Amendment
rights in broadcasting, the right of the listeners and viewers is para-
mount.'2 3  Furthermore, equating the licensing of broadcasters with
118. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1, at 26380; Com-
plaint concerning "The Selling of the Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971).
119. ASHMORE, supra note 7, at chs. 7 & 8.
120. ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE
UNITED STATES, AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE NEWS MEDIA-FINAL REPORT 21-22 (1973).
121. Id. at 23 (Commentary on Broadcast Journalism).
122. id. at 26.
123. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
102 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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the grant of reduced mail rates to the print media casts an air of unreality
over the conference proceedings and report. Thus, Professor Thomas
I. Emerson, one of the dissenters from the conference's conclusions,
stated:
I strongly dissent from [the recommendation] to "deregulate" the
radio and television media. The stated purpose is to create "free-
dom for each and every form and portion of the media to choose
,the mode and content of its own expression." In my judgment this
approach embodies a very limited view of the real impact of total
decontrol upon -the system of free expression in this country.
There is no assurance whatever that abandonment of the Fairness
Doctrine, of the rules for encouraging diversification in program-
ming, or of similar FCC requirements would result in greater di-
versity of expression or increased access for persons wishing to use
-the broadcast media. On the contrary, the result would only be
to assure a continuing monopoly of expression to existing owners
and operators of the broadcasting facilities.
124
In 1971 the Office of Telecommunications Policy, which advises
the president on communications, recommended that AM and FM
radio be deregulated and that experimental deregulation of one or two
stations, including the suspension of the fairness doctrine, be con-
ducted.125  The FCC has undertaken such an experiment.- 26  How-
ever, a limited experiment in deregulation of radio is unlikely to lay
an objective basis for evaluation of the need to continue the fairness
doctrine. Broadcasters' programming judgments in such a limited ex-
periment may be influenced by their status as "silent trustees" of the
broadcasting industry's interest in future deregulation.
The Fairness Doctrine: Protecting the Need to Know
In broadcasting Congress and the FCC have converted the
people's need to know into a right to know by applying the fairness
doctrine. The Supreme Court has determined that the interest of lis-
teners and viewers is paramount among the various First Amendment
interests involved, and hence, that the fairness doctrine does not violate
the broadcasters' freedom of press. Like most doctrines, the fairness
124. ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE E WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE
UNIrED STATES, AMEmcAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
Tm NEws MErA-FAL REPORT 30 (1973).
125. OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS PoLICY, THE REGULATION OF COMVMMRCAL
RADIO STATIONS (1971); Hearings on Overview of the Office of Telecommunications
Policy Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
93d Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 93-2, at 9 (1973).
126. FCC, Broadcast Regulation Study, Apr. 6, 1972.
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doctrine is subject to improvement. 12 7  However, the conclusion of
some well-meaning citizens that broadcasting should be deregulated is
based on the unsound premise that if broadcasting is free of govern-
mental regulation it will be in a better position to prevent thought con-
trol by government. 2 "
The ability of the medium to keep a watchful eye on government
is not diminished by requiring broadcasters to observe the fairness doc-
trine. Rather, the requirement that broadcasters allocate reasonable
time to public issues and present contrasting viewpoints on such issues
creates a salubrious journalistic environment. In carrying out their
journalistic responsibility, broadcasters often ferret out conduct of gov-
ernment officials in concealing activities, issuing incomplete, mislead-
ing, or false statements, or propagandizing. It is noteworthy that the
actions during the Nixon administration deemed repressive of the
media,12 9 which prompted some citizens to urge deregulation of broad-
casting, were exposed by broadcasting as well as print media.
If the limited regulation of journalistic responsibility under the
fairness doctrine were abandoned, it is likely that the issues ventilated
and points of view aired would be more representative of the interests
of broadcasting owners and managers than of the public's interest. The
very development of chains of stations, with concentration of control
of program content, which motivated Congress to regulate broadcasting
in the first instance, lends credence to the threat of potential control
of public opinion and the political process by broadcasters unrestrained
by the fairness doctrine. In our representative democracy, the need
of the people to know should continue to be a right to know. Congress
and the FCC, accordingly, should retain the fairness doctrine, and the
FCC's strong reemphasis of the doctrine's importance and practicality
in its most recent policy statement regarding the doctrine 3 ° augurs its
continuation in radio and television for the foreseeable future.
127. For a suggested practical system of citizen access and criteria for selecting vi-
tal issues for broadcast, see text accompanying notes 62-64 supra. See also H. GELLER,
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING passim (1973); Doctrines in Broadcasting,
supra note 35, at 542-44.
128. For example, Ashmore's report on the conference conducted by the Center for
Study of Democratic Institutions, as the title Fear in the Air indicates, describes Nixon
administration actions deemed repressive of the media, and asserts that the gains from
media freedom outweigh any losses from media irresponsibility resulting from deregula-
tion. ASHMORE, supra note 7.
129. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
130. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, supra note 1,
[Vol. 26
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The Print Media's Freedom from the Fairness Doctrine
Tornillo: Free Press versus Right to Reply
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,'3' the United States
Supreme Court, reversing the Supreme Court of Florida, held that
Florida's statute'32 giving a political candidate whose personal character
is attacked during a campaign a right of reply was an unconstitutional
violation of freedom of the press. The Florida Supreme Court, empha-
sizing the people's need to know, had found that free speech was en-
hanced rather than abridged by the statute and had held that the statute
did not violate the First Amendment.'33 The Florida court reasoned:
Recognizing that ,there is a right to publish without prior govern-
mental restraint, we also emphasize that there is a correlative re-
sponsibility that the public be fully informed ...
The public "need to know" is most critical during an elec-
tion campaign ....
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and
from such information to be able to make an enlightened choice
is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the owner-
ship of the mass media into fewer and fewer hands, resulting
ultimately in a form of private censorship ...
Freedom of expression was retained by the people through the
First Amendment for all the people and not merely for a select few.
The First Amendment did not create a privileged class which
through a monopoly of instruments of the newspaper industry
would be able to deny to the people the freedom of expression
which the First Amendment guarantees. 34
The Florida Supreme Court thus balanced the First Amendment inter-
ests of publishers, candidates, and readers, much as the United States
Supreme Court had balanced the interests of broadcasters, those seek-
ing access to broadcasting, and listeners and viewers in the Red Lion
case.13 5 In upholding the constitutionality of the application of the fair-
131. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
132. Florida Statutes Annotated section 104.38 provides: "If any newspaper in its
columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election
in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or
otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such
newspaper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any re-
ply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as
the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space
than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the provisions
of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as pro-
vided in § 775.082 or - 775.083." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973).
133. 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973).
134. Id. at 80, 82-83 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original deleted).
135. Rel Lion Broadcasting C9. v, FCC, 395 U.S, 367, 390 (1969).
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ness doctrine to broadcasting, the Red Lion court declared the interest
of the listeners and viewers "paramount"; similarly, the Florida tribunal
gave greater weight to the need of the electorate for objective informa-
tion regarding the qualifications of political candidates. Yet in revers-
ing the Florida decision, the United States Supreme Court refused to
apply to the print media the concept of accommodation of First Amend-
ment interests which it had applied to broadcasting. Rather, the Court
considered solely the effect of the right-to-reply statute on the right of
publishers to determine what they will print:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with
a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forego publica-
tion of news or opinion by -the inclusion of a reply, the Florida stat-
ute fails -to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of
its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size of the paper, and content, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitutes the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.136
It may be noted that Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, while concurring,
reserved judgment on whether a statute requiring print media to retract
defamatory falsehoods would violate the First Amendment. 3 If such
a retraction can validly be required, the journalistic freedom of the print
media is not absolute, contrary to what the majority opinion indicates.
The Numbers Game: Systems Limitations in Broadcasting and Print
The Supreme Court's approach to the fairness doctrine in broad-
casting 13 and the prohibition of the right-to-reply statute in print media
can be reconciled on the ground of the natural limitation of the broad-
casting spectrum and the lack of such limitation on the number of print
media. As noted previously, the Court relied substantially on the scar-
city of broadcasting channels to sustain the constitutionality of the appli-
cation of the fairness doctrine to broadcasting in the Red Lion case.'
39
However, economic limitations on the print media have resulted
in concentration of control similar to that existing in broadcasting at the
local level. In 1972, there were 8,253 broadcasting stations and only
136. 94 S. Ct. at 2839-40 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 2840.
138. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
139. Id. at 399-401. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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1,728 daily newspapers.14 ° Moreover, competing daily newspapers are
rare. In 1967, the concentration of daily newspaper ownership was as
follows:' in only 3 American cities-Boston, New York, and Wash-
ington-did more than 2 daily newspaper ownerships compete. In
only 64 cities were there 2 daily newspapers held by two different own-
ers. In 141 cities there were 2 daily newspapers under the same own-
ership. In only twenty-six states was there more than 1 city in which
daily newspapers competed; in seventeen states there were no daily
competing newspapers. In 23 cities, daily newspaper were published
under joint operating agreements. One-half of the daily newspapers
were owned by chains, and their circulation was 62 percent of the total
daily newspaper circulation. The concentration was aggravated by the
common ownership of several daily newspapers and several broadcast-
ing stations. In addition, nationally syndicated columnists contributed
to the homogeneity of editorial opinion.
The high concentration of ownership of the print media was a
strong factor in the Florida Supreme Court's decision that the right-to-
reply statute did not violate the First Amendment. On this point, the
court stated:
Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition of radio and televi-
sion stations and -the demise of vast numbers of newspapers, com-
petition is rapidly vanishing and news corporations are acquiring
monopolistic influence over huge areas of the country.142
The court noted that the Miami Herald is the largest newspaper pub-
lished in the state, and is "not only a large city daily newspaper but
also is a regional and international newspaper."' 4'  A personal attack
on a political candidate by the most important newspaper in an area
of heavy concentration of newspaper ownership may seriously impede
the opportunity of the electorate to reach an informed opinion on the
qualifications of the opposing candidates.
Our constitutional fathers wrote the First Amendment guarantees
of freedom of speech and press in the period of Tom Paine. Dick and
Harry did not need access to Tom's penny sheet because they could
set up a printing press in the basement and print their own sheet. To-
day, however, newspapers are big business. Concentration has largely
140. 1973 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 12; NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASs'N, WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 323 (1974).
141. For substantiation of the data in the text, see B. RuCKER, TBE Frst FREEDOM
(1968), reviewed by Barrow, 15 N.Y.L.F. 999 (1969).
142. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1973).
143. Id.
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removed competition. In general, the editorial policies of the print
media represent the interests of the owners. Of course, reporters usu-
ally have a large measure of independence. But in the important areas
of political elections and opinion on vital issues the owners exercise
control. The capital required to publish modem newspapers means
that the owners are in the wealthy end of the economic scale. Those
who commit their wealth to newspaper communications are interested
in shaping public opinion and in aiding the election of candidates of
their choice. For example, in the ten-day period preceding an election,
it is common practice for a newspaper to run in a favored location in
the paper for several consecutive days the list of candidates which the
newspaper recommends for election. Editorial opinion favors some
candidates, opposes others, and presents the owner's point of view on
the issues in the election. In Tom Paine's time a variety of viewpoints
found outlets through the many penny sheets. Today in the time of
Hearst, Scripps-Howard, Knight, and other newspaper chains, the num-
ber of viewpoints printed is limited, and the scope is not representative
of the whole society.
Press Freedom Under the Law of Defamation
The impact of the Tornillo case in denying the need of the people
to know is aggravated by the law of defamation. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,14 4 the Supreme Court held that if a public official or
public figure were defamed by a newspaper, the defamed person could
recover damages for defamation only if he could prove that publication
of the defamatory falsehood was "with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.' 45  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 46 the Su-
preme Court extended this standard to defamatory falsehood occurring
in the context of "all discussion and communication involving matters
of public or general concern."147
On the same day that it decided the Tornillo case, the Supreme
Court ruled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'48 that a newspaper which
publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a
public official nor a public figure has no constitutional privilege against
144. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145. Id. at 279-80. The extension of the doctrine to public figures was made in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
146. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
147. Id. at 44.
148. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
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liability, even if the falsehoods were published in a discussion of a mat-
ter of public interest. However, the Court further stated that proof of
failure to investigate the matter stated falsely does not establish "actual
malice' and held that, unless actual malice is proved, recovery is limited
to damages for the actual injury shown.
149
Possibly the majority of the Court thought that the Gertz decision
would reduce the impact of Tornillo on individuals who are not public
officials or public figures. While declaring that a right-of-reply statute
applicable to political candidates violates freedom of the press, Tornillo
renders any future right-of-reply statute by private individuals a fortiori
an infringement of freedom of the press. Concurring in Tornillo, Mr.
Justice White-one of the four dissenters in Gertz-complained that
the Court had not forged the correct balance in the two cases, stating:
To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual dignity, as
-the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete
mercy of the press, at least in this stage of our history when the
press, as the majority in this case so Well documents, is steadily be-
coming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by
-threats of libel suits.' 50
However, even an appropriate balance between press freedom
and remedy for the defamed person does not reach the greater harm
which is done by defamation of a political candidate or a representative
of a viewpoint on a controversial issue of public importance. The cap-
sheaf on the scale of societal values is the political process. If the most
meritorious candidate loses because he was falsely defamed, or if a
meritorious issue submitted to the electorate in a referendum loses be-
cause spokesmen for it are falsely defamed, the greatest loss is the pub-
lie's, through the misleading of the electorate to an unwise choice. The
Tornillo case, coupled with the defamation law following New York
Times, leaves both the person attacked and, more importantly, the elec-
torate, in the words of Mr. Justice White, "at the complete mercy of
the press.''
A free trade in ideas disciplined by the competition of the market,
envisioned by Mr. Justice Holmes,' does not exist today. The eco-
nomic factors which have driven many newspapers from the market
149. Id. at 3003, 3012.
150. 94 S. Ct. 2831, 2842 (1974); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997,
3038 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
151. 94 S. Ct. at 2842.
152. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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practically exclude new entry.' 53 Professor Jerome Barron, in view of
these circumstances, has advocated a constitutional right of access to
newspapers for confrontation of ideas." 4 Professor Zachariah Chafee,
Jr., discussing the relationship between the government and the press,
noted:
The mere absence of governmental restrictions will not make news-
papers and other instrumentalities of communication play their
proper part in the kind of society we desire. In addition, affirma-
tive action must be taken either by the government or by other per-
sons with power to influence methods and content. 155
Nevertheless, Professor Chafee saw danger in "letting the camel's nose
into the tent" of the press15 6 and warned:
[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries
to compel what is to go into a newspaper. A journal does not
merely print observed facts the way a cow is photographed through
a plate-glass window. As soon as the facts are set in their context,
you have interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selec-
tion opens the way to editorial suppression. Then how can the
state force abstention from discrimination in the news without dic-
tating selection?15 7
Professor Thomas I. Emerson recognizes that "a limited right of
access to the press can be safely enforced."' 58  Professor Emerson ap-
proaches the First Amendment problem in terms of balancing diversity
of viewpoints against interference with journalistic discretion:
The right of reply to libelous matter, and perhaps the right to buy
noncommercial advertising space, could be imposed by judicial ac-
tion, were a court disposed to do so. The other rights of access
would almost certainly have to be established in the first instance
by legislative action. More important for First Amendment pur-
poses, however, would be the nature of the administrative ma-
chinery necessary to enforce the various kinds of controls effec-
tively. The first two categories-the noncommercial advertise-
ments and the reply to libel or personal attack--could be phrased
in precise terms and readily administered through the usual forms
of judicial process . . . . The obligation to print statements, on
the other hand, would raise intricate problems . . . . The "fair-
ness doctrine" would be even more complex to administer. It is
153. The economic facts of life with regard to failing newspapers prompted Con-
gress to except joint publishing operations from the antitrust laws. Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1974).
154. FREEDOM FOR WHOM?, supra note 25. Professor Barron was counsel for
Tornillo in the Miami Herald case. His position that there is a constitutional right of
access for the confrontation of ideas was, of course, rejected in Miami Herald.
155. CHAFEE, supra note 19, at 471.
156. Id. at 709.
157. Id. at 633.
158. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 671 (1970).
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likely that these two latter categories could be enforced, if at all,
only -through some form of administrative tribunal.
If we apply to -this situation the ftwo tests set forth above,
which limit the power of government to promote the system of free-
dom of expression by control of the mass media, the first two forms
of regulation might be found valid and the second two invalid un-
der the First Amendment. In their substantive impact the first two
regulations would increase the number of participants and produce
greater diversity; ,they would not seem to entail any serious adverse
effect upon the newspaper and the need to know. 159
Tornillo and the Need to Know
Our First Amendment concerns have grown greatly since the con-
stitutional fathers first adopted the guarantee of freedom of speech and
press.160 Nevertheless, it is questionable that any of these concerns is
threatened by a right-to-reply statute such as was involved in the
Tornillo case. The need of the people to know is clear.
Unless they are informed, our citizens give up the effort to under-
stand our problems and withdraw from the decisionmaking forum.
61
Our laws can encourage or discourage their participation. All our law,
constitutional law or otherwise, has its foundation in societal values.
Certainly, the capsheaf of these values is informed participation by the
people in the sound decision of our political and other vital issues. This
highest priority in our societal values was at stake in the Tornillo case.
The Supreme Court's decision will permit a newspaper to misinform
the electorate by attacking the character of one candidate while praising
159. Id. at 670-71. Of course, the Supreme Court in the Miami Herald case has
taken the position that government cannot require newspapers to print an editorial mes-
sage of any kind. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376 (1973), the Court upheld, against attack on freedom of the press grounds,
an ordinance which forbade newspapers from placing job advertisements in separate
male and female categories. However, the Court has long recognized that commercial
advertising does not merit the First Amendment protection accorded printed matter con-
taining noncommercial ideas. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
160. Hearings on Freedom of the Press Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judicary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., at 175 (1972)
(statement of Prof. L. Levy).
161. Justice Frankfurther wrote:
"In the years between the wars few things were more disturbing than the number of citi-
zens who gave up the effort to understand our problems. . . . Education means the
power to reduce the number of citizens who give up the effort of disinterested and re-
sponsible understanding. . . . For where the effort is made, there citizens are found;
and where citizens are found, responsibility is squarely forced upon a statesman to ex-
plain, if need be to justify, the policy he proposes." Frankfurter, There Is No Middle
Way, SATuRDAY R v. oF LrrmlATuRa, Oct. 26, 1946, at 21, quoted in CHAFEB, supra note
19, at 753.
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his opponent. Such attacks typically occur near the end of a political
campaign, and the citizen thus goes to the polls without having had an
opportunity to ascertain the truth. Elections may be decided by
citizens voting contrary to the way they would have voted had they not
been misinformed. Certainly, if there is a practical way to clear the
air of false, personal attacks on candidates without interfering with the
journalistic discretion of the newspaper, it should not fall afoul of the
First Amendment to require a newspaper to carry a correction or even
to permit the maligned candidate to reply.
There is such a practical way to administer charges by candidates
that a newspaper has attacked their character in a manner which may
confuse the voters and lead to a nonobjective choice at the polls. A
representative committee of citizens, chosen by such procedure as the
community may prefer, could examine such charges by a candidate
against a local newspaper and determine whether a right of reply was
justified in the particular case. It is unlikely that such a procedure
would overburden the newspapers with demands for column space. If,
in the stringent financial circumstances of newspapers, the allocation
of columns for the right of reply should prove to be an economic bur-
den, government might well grant a subsidy to the local committee for
payment for the columns so used.
162
The notion of subsidy arouses fears of government domination of
the press. However, the payment could be in the form of a "hand out'
to the committee, without government power to dictate the committee's
choice of replies to be published or the newspaper's exercise of journal-
istic discretion. Indeed, the committee might select appropriate writers
on neglected issues for publication in subsidized columns without in-
volving the complicated administrative machinery or interfering with
the operation of the newspaper.
The Tornillo case precludes enforced access to newspapers by a
representative committee of private citizens either replying to personal
attacks against political candidates or merely presenting neglected is-
sues. Hence, any plan of better fulfilling the need of the people to
know through the print media can be achieved only through the volun-
tary cooperation of newspapers. Such cooperation is already present
to some extent; for example, newspapers typically carry a substantial
number of letters from their readers, and these are usually chosen to
162. Any such procedure should be limited to daily newspapers, and possibly na-
tional news weeklies with major circulation, as these have the most significant impact
on the political process and public opinion.
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reflect varying viewpoints on significant issues. Further, the New York
Times, the Washington Post, and a few other newspapers have adopted
a practice of including on their "op-ed" (opposite editorial) page col-
umns by persons representing a broad spectrum of opinion.
In such newspapers, freedom of the print media is accompanied
by a high degree of journalistic responsibility. Nevertheless, more
could and should be done. A political candidate or other citizen who
is personally attacked or falsely defamed by a newspaper should be
given, voluntarily, an opportunity to reply. If there is substantial com-
plaint that a newspaper is presenting only one point of view on an im-
portant public issue, or is neglecting any side of such issue, the news-
paper should likewise voluntarily provide space for the airing of such
other views. The newspaper might well voluntarily invite the com-
munity which it serves to establish a representative committee to ad-
minister the selection of issues for airing and spokesmen for the view-
points to be presented. In addition, such a committee might be given
responsibility for determining whether a person claiming that he has
been personally attacked or falsely defamed has sufficient merit to his
case to justify the newspaper's voluntarily granting a right of reply.
Such voluntary adoption of a policy of access to newspapers would serve
as a benchmark of journalistic responsibility and avoid the necessity
for any future reexamination of the journalistic freedom assured to
newspapers by the Tornillo doctrine.1 63
The Fairness Doctrine in Cable Television
The FCC has applied the fairness doctrine and companion equal
opportunities in political broadcasting doctrine to cable television in the
same manner that the doctrines are applied to broadcasting.16 4  More-
over, cable television operators are required to provide public access
channels for the purposes of government, education and discussion of
public issues and to originate programming. 16 5 In May of 1974 the
163. Some of the major newspapers have refused to cooperate with the National
News Council's efforts involving complaints against the media. See text accompanying
note 119 supra. Although the purpose of the council is to protect the news media from
greater intrusion by government, the print media, accustomed to a complete freedom
from regulation which is not accorded to the electronic media, may well reject any such
suggestions for greater voluntary journalistic responsibility. Such a course, if it should
lead to substantial harm to the electorate and political candidates, could force a reopen-
ing of the question of balance of freedom and responsibility in the print media.
164. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1973).
165, Id. 0§ 76.201-.251.
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FCC announced that its cable television rules, 166 which were adopted
only two years earlier, will be reviewed in the light of experience under
the rules to determine whether they should be changed. 16 7  In such
review, it is anticipated that issues will include whether the fairness
doctrine, the companion equal opportunities in political broadcasting
doctrine, and the program origination and public access requirements
should continue to be applied to cable television.
Society has been thrust to the threshold of a communications revo-
lution by the development of cable television and its information and
entertainment capacities.'68 When fully developed, cable television
will change our social, professional and commercial life as nothing has
since the printing press. 169 Cable television has the potential to pro-
vide the individual with a complete information environment by linking
data storage and retrieval mechanisms, computers, facsimile devices,
166. The rules and the FCC's covering opinion are published in the Federal Register.
37 Fed. Reg. 3252-341 (1972). The rules are codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617
(1973). For an analysis of the rules, see Barrow, The New CATV Rules: Proceed on
Delayed Yelloi, 25 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1972).
167. FCC Cable Television Re-Regulation Study, Public Notice No. G 21786 (May
15, 1974).
168. For a description of the technology, see sources cited note 14, supra. See also
W. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DECISIONMAKING (1973) [hereinafter
cited as BAER].
169. Present cable television service consists largely of television programs captured
from the air and distributed via cable to subscribers. However, when cable television
achieves heavy penetration of homes and offices it will be economically feasible to pro-
vide many new services, the technology for which is already available and some of
which are already in use in point to point systems. As the income from cable operations
is not limited to advertising but includes subscription fees and leased cable rental fees,
the advertisers' cost-per-thousand viewers standard, which determines the character of
commercial broadcasting's programming, need not have such great impact on cable tele-
vision's service. Thus, it is practical to provide needed program service to special groups
such as children, the aged, gardening enthusiasts, minorities, underprivileged, and the
like. Public information channels can provide information and counseling regarding em-
ployment, welfare and health services. Doctors can transmit medical diagnostical ma-
terials, such as cardiograms, to special clinics and consult by two way communication.
Lawyers can retrieve from data banks the precedents applicable to their cases. Business-
men can negotiate by two way video and save time lost in travel. Merchants can display
goods by cable, and the housewife can shop without going to the store. Banking can
be handled by two way cable response. Scholars can conduct raw research by retrieving
information stored in data banks, thus saving time for evaluation and judgment. Educa-
tional television can increase the variety of services through cable television. The uni-
versities can deliver higher education to the home through two way communication.
Mortgages and other security interests, subject to public notice filing, can be recorded
and searched through data storage and retrieval. Traffic can be expedited through cable
television supervision. The foregoing examples are only a few illustrations of applica-
tions of the existing and potential cable television technology. The applications are lim-
ited only by economics, imagination and will.
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space satellites, and other communications technology to television sets,
radio receivers, and other terminals in the individual's home. Cable
television provides further possibility for profound change through its
potential for two-way communication---digitally, vocally, and, when the
economic cost is reduced by mass use, visually. The individual need
no longer be a passive recipient of information chosen and transmitted
by others. With the aid of cable television, he can select from the mass
of information and entertainment stored in data banks and computer
centers that which fulfills his needs, tastes, or desires.
The greatest implication of the electronic communications revolu-
tion represented by cable television, however, is the opportunity for the
individual to participate in decisionmaking. The individual has been
substantially isolated from the decisionmaking process. As our prob-
lems grow more complex and time for decision shortens, decisionmak-
ing is vested more and more in an elite. With wise use, the new com-
munications technology will encourage the individual to participate in
the decision of public issues. Preference polling on political matters
will be feasible. An informational base can be laid for enlightened
participation and consent by the people in self-government. Consensus
and support for the solutions will then be possible. Through cable tele-
vision the town meeting of our early history can be restored at the local
level and established at the state and national levels. Such a potential
national town meeting provides another opportunity to win the race be-
tween education and catastrophe. But will our policy makers take ad-
vantage of this opportunity? Some welcome broad participation by our
citizens in self-government; many fear such a development. In varying
degree, the Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian conflict 17° has continued through-
out our history. Whether the electronic communications revolution is
to be used to restore the individual to a responsible role in decisionmak-
ing or is to be limited to serving commercial, professional, and enter-
tainment needs is a policy decision now in the making.
Communications Common Carriers and the First Amendment Balance
The First Amendment interests to be accommodated in the com-
munications media are affected by the character of the media. The
print media are typical private free enterprises. Telephone, telegraph
and transoceanic cable are common carriers. Broadcasting and cable
television occupy a position between these poles, with characteristics
of each.
170. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
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In the regulation of communications common carriers, Congress
authorized the FCC to require access upon reasonable request, to set
just and reasonable rates, and to -assure uniform treatment of members
of each class of users. 171 Common carriers are granted monopoly sta-
tus because competition in the areas of service involved is wasteful.
Regulation is substituted for competition to assure service in the public
interest. The communications common carriers do not editorialize or
originate programming and do not provide a forum for political appear-
ances or discussion of public issues. Hence, there exists no First
Amendment interest of the communications common carrier to be ac-
commodated with the interests of others.
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress declared that
broadcasters are not common carriers,1 72 and the Supreme Court has
observed that, as to broadcasting, "Congress has not, in its regulatory
scheme, abandoned the principle of free competition .... ,,:71
Broadcasters' rates are not controlled by the FCC and anticompetitive
practices are prohibited. 74  Yet, broadcasters are licensed and their
program service is regulated in the public interest. As discussed
earlier, 75 requiring licensed broadcasters to allocate reasonable time
for the presentation of public issues and viewpoints on these issues does
not violate the freedom of the press of broadcasters. Also, as noted
above, 70 just as the FCC's determination that broadcasters are not re-
quired to grant access to parties desiring to present editorial advertise-
ments does not violate the freedom of speech of such parties, if the
FCC should devise a practical plan of access for such editorial adver-
tisements and compel broadcaster compliance, this requirement would
not violate the broadcasters' freedom of the press.
Broadcasting thus occupies a place in the regulatory framework
between typical free enterprise and communications common carriers.
The broadcaster has First Amendment interests because he editorial-
izes and represents a viewpoint on public issues. But the broadcaster's
interests must be accommodated with the First Amendment interests
of networks, independent program producers, persons seeking access
171. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-02 (1970).
172. Id. § 153(h).
173. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1940). The anti-
trust laws apply to broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (1970). The Department of Jus-
tice has primary jurisdiction in antitrust actions against broadcasters. United States v.
Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
174. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303, 307 (1970).
175. See text accompanying notes 45-57 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 57-64 supra,
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to the publicly owned airwaves, and, most importantly, the interest of
listeners and viewers, which the Supreme Court has deemed "para-
mount" among the various First Amendment interests involved.
177
Thus, as discussed earlier, the complex issues of freedom of speech and
press have, in the broadcasting field, been resolved in favor of the con-
stitutionality of regulation.
178
Cable television occupies a position somewhere between broad-
casting and communications common carriers. If cable television were
a communications common carrier, like telegraph, telephone, and trans-
oceanic cable, the FCC could exercise pervasive regulation of rates, ac-
cess and service without raising an issue of the freedom of press of
cable operators. However, the FCC, in its regulation of cable televi-
sion, has impressed upon that medium a sui generis character. Like
broadcasters, cable operators are required by the commission to comply
with the fairness doctrine and the equal opportunities in political broad-
casting doctrine.1 79  Moreover, cable operators must provide free pub-
lic access channels'8 0 and originate programming.""s These require-
ments are of the same character as those impressed upon broadcasting.
On the other hand, several requirements imposed by the FCC on cable
operators partake of the character of regulations governing communica-
tions common carriers. Leased channels must be offered on a nondis-
criminatory basis.' The local franchising authority is delegated power
to regulate the fees charged to subscribers.' 83 Although the rates
charged to lessees of channels' 84 and advertisers 88 are not regulated,
the technical standards of cable television equipment, like communica-
tions common carrier equipment, are regulated.' 88  Thus, cable tele-
vision, which is neither a common carrier 8 7 nor a typical free enter-
177. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
178. Id.; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
179. See note 164 & accompanying text supra.
180. See note 165 & accompanying text supra.
181. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1973). During the litigation in United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), the FCC suspended the program origination rule.
Although the Supreme Court in that case sustained the jurisdiction and authority of the
FCC to promulgate the rule, the FCC has not been able to muster a majority vote to
lift its suspension.
182. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251(a) (7), (11) (iii) (1973).
183. Id. § 76.31(a) (4).
184. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(iii).
185. Cf. id. § 76.217.
186. Id. § 76.251.
187. Initially the FCC denied that it had jurisdiction of cable television on the
ground that it was not a common carrier. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24
F.C.C. 251 (1958). The broadcasting industry prevailed on the FCC to reconsider the
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prise, is regulated to a greater extent than broadcasting but less than
common carriers.
The First Amendment Issues in Cable Television
In view of the above-described characteristics of cable television,
it is surprising that issues of freedom of speech and press have not
arisen in cable television as they have in broadcasting. The explana-
tion may lie in the fact that because cable television resembles com-
munications common carriers more than broadcasting does and, as reg-
ulation of broadcasting has been held compatible with the First Amend-
ment, a fortiori similar regulation of cable television would be constitu-
tional.
The broadcasting regulations which apply to cable television and
which have raised the strongest issues of freedom of speech and press
are the fairness doctrine, the equal opportunities in political broadcast-
ing doctrine, and the requirement of diversity in program service. As
observed in the earlier discussion of the Red Lion case,188 the Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in broad-
casting against attack on the ground of freedom of speech and press.
Mr. Justice White's opinion makes clear that the companion equal op-
portunities in political broadcasting doctrine also conforms with the
First Amendment. 9 As the First Amendment interest of cable oper-
ators is no greater-if as great-as that of broadcasters, it may be confi-
dently predicted that the Supreme Court would sustain the application
of the fairness doctrine and the equal opportunities in political broad-
casting doctrine to cable operators.
Similarly, it would seem that the requirement that cable operators
provide free public access channels would be sustained against any at-
tack on First Amendment grounds. In Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,'9" Chief Justice Burger stated
issue of jurisdiction of cable television. Again the FCC denied that it had jurisdiction,
stating: "In essence, the broadcasters' position shakes down to the fundamental propo-
sition that they wish us to regulate in a manner favorable toward them vis-a-vis any
nonbroadcast competitive enterprise." CATV AND TV REPEATER SERVICES REPORT, 26
F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959). The FCC later changed its position and asserted jurisdiction.
See note 201 infra. Judicial support for the proposition that cable television is not a com-
mon carrier is found in Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
188. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See text accom-
panying notes 45-53 supra.
189. 395 U.S. at 391.
190. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See note 55 supra.
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that if the FCC should devise a practical plan of access to broadcasting
for editorial advertisements, compelled access for this purpose would
not violate the broadcasters' freedom of the press. In cable television,
the great channel capacity' 91 of cable systems has enabled the FCC to
devise such a practical plan. A reasonable number of channels are
dedicated for free public access on a first-come first-served basis.192
Hence, the standard set in the Democratic National Committee case' 93
has been met, no First Amendment interest of the cable operator has
been infringed, and the access provision seems safe from attack on the
ground of freedom of speech or press.
Another parallel in the FCC's treatment of broadcasters and cable
operators is the rules designed to promote diversity in program service.
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 94 the Supreme Court
upheld the FCC's chain broadcasting rules against First Amendment
attack. The rules were designed to stimulate diversity in programming
and to free the licensed broadcasters from restraints in contracts with
networks, so that the broadcasters could better exercise their responsi-
bility as trustees of the publicly owned channels. 9 5 In sustaining the
constitutionality of the rules, the Court emphasized the natural limita-
tions of the radio spectrum. 196 In United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 17 the Supreme Court held that the FCC had jurisdiction and
authority to issue a regulation 98 requiring cable operators to originate
programming and provide facilities for local production and presenta-
tion of programs. Although the fact context was appropriate for a rul-
ing on the freedom of press of the cable operators, the issue was not
raised.
The FCC's program origination rule is intended to promote diver-
191. The FCC requires cable capacity of at least twenty channels. 47 C.F.R. §
76.251(a) (1) (1973). When all channels are in use, the cable operator must activate
another channel. 37 Fed. Reg. 3270, 126 (1972). As the cost of laying two cables
simultaneously is much less per cable than laying cables at different times, in substantial
metropolitan areas the practice is to lay two cables and to activate the second one when
needed. Cables of forty channel capacity are in use, and cables of sixty and eighty
channel capacity are anticipated. The requirement that the cable operator carry all local
over-the-air television signals reduces the number of channels for other programming.
47 C.F.R. § 74.1103 (1973).
192. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973).
193. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
194. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
195. See note 43 supra.
196. 319 U.S. at 226-27, quoted in text accompanying note 44 supra.
197. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
198. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973).
January 1975]
sity of the cable operator's service and fulfillment of local needs for
program service. There is a superficial distinction between cable tele-
vision and broadcasting vis-d.-vis the origination requirements in that a
cable system has numerous channels while a broadcasting station has
only one. However, if the cable operator were not required to orig-
inate programming and provide program origination facilities, the dire
need for program service might not be fulfilled. Rather, the lease of
channels by profit-making institutions for conduct of their business
might well drive out of cable those persons and nonprofit institutions
desiring to fill ascertained needs for service. While the state or local
franchising authority has power to grant more than one franchise in the
same geographical area,199 as a practical matter the revenue available
in the present state of the art will not support competing cable systems
in the same geographical area.200 In view of the monopoly position
held by the cable operator, rules requiring the cable operator to orig-
inate programming and to provide facilities for presentation of pro-
grams produced locally do not contravene the cable operators' freedom
of press.
Regulatory Jurisdiction and Policy Questions
Although cable television came into being long after the enact-
ment of the statutes providing for the regulation of wire and radio com-
munications, the jurisdiction of the FCC over cable television is sub-
stantially plenary.20 ' Thus, in Midwest Video the Supreme Court
stated:
199. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1973).
200. In order to attract investment capital and to derive income rendering the cable
operation profitable, the potential service area must include a substantial population and
there must be a probability that from 40 to 60% of the population will subscribe. The
requisite penetration for an economically sound cable system is a product of several fac-
tors: density of population; average income of the population in the service area; compe-
tition for investment of capital; and size of fees charged to subscribers. L.L. JOHNSON,
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DAYTON MIAMI VALLEY: BASIC REPORT ch. 5 (1972).
201. After first denying that it had jurisdiction over cable television (see note 187
supra), the FCC asserted "indirect" jurisdiction over microwave relay carriers used to
import television signals for transmission by cable to subscribers. Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), afj'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In
Carter Mountain, the FCC did not exercise jurisdiction over cable television on the basis
of its common carrier characteristics; rather, it reasoned that it had jurisdiction over mi-
crowave relay carriers and that the cable television system was a mere extension of the
microwave relay carriers. Such indirect jurisdiction inherently limits the FCC's power
over cable television. For example, under indirect jurisdiction stemming from regulation
of microwave relay carriers, it would be difficult to sustain a rule that cable operators
must originate programming. In the FCC Second Report and Order on CATV, the
commission asserted that it has "ancillary" jurisdiction of cable television to the degree
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In short, the regulatory authority asserted by the Commission in
1966 and generally sustained by this Court in Southwestern was
authority to regulate CATV with a view not merely to protect but
to promote the objectives for which the Commission had been as-
signed jurisdiction over broadcasting.
The effect of the [program origination] regulation, after all, is
to assure that in the retransmission of broadcast signals viewers are
provided suitably diversified programming-the same objective
underlying [the chain broadcasting] regulations sustained in Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States .... 202
Thus the FCC has jurisdiction and authority to apply the fairness
doctrine, equal opportunities in political broadcasting doctrine, and di-
versity regulations such as the program origination rule, to cable televi-
sion. Nevertheless, sound legislative policy suggests that when a com-
munications revolution such as that inherent in the potential of cable
television occurs, Congress should enact legislative standards to guide
the FCC along the road of regulation. 0 3 As neither the First Amend-
ment nor any jurisdictional block prevents the FCC from applying the
fairness doctrine to cable television, the issue is one of policy: should
the fairness doctrine, the related equal opportunities in political broad-
casting doctrine, and the program origination requirement be applied
to cable television?
Several governmental studies have dealt with these policy ques-
tions. In 1968, the President's Task Force on Communications Policy
stressed diversity in program service as the major public policy goal for
communications and recommended a regulatory policy which would en-
courage cable television to contribute to diversity.204 This report did
not address itself to whether the fairness doctrine should be applied
to cable television. In 1971, the Sloan Commission on Cable Coin-
necessary to prevent frustration of its policies and regulations relating to broadcasting.
2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., the Supreme
Court upheld both the indirect and ancillary bases of the FCC's cable television jurisdic-
tion. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
202. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667, 669 (1972) (em-
phasis added).
203. Midwest Video is a plurality decision. The minority of four strongly con-
tended that the FCC did not have authority to require cable operators to originate pro-
gramming. Id. at 677. Four other justices concluded that the FCC had such authority.
Id. at 667, 669. Chief Justice Burger's opinion concurring with the latter four is mari-
nated in doubt and he expressly so concurred "until Congress acts." Id. at 676. The
jurisdiction and authority of the FCC over cable television should be determined by the
Congress. Barrow, The New CATV Rules: Proceed on Delayed Yellow, 25 VAm. L.
Rav. 681, 701-02 (1972).
204. PRnsimmev's TASK FoncE, ON COMmuCATmioNS PoLIcy, FiNAL REPORT ch. 7
(1968).
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munications recommended that the fairness doctrine should not be ap-
plied to "public access channels" and the companion equal opportun-
ities in political broadcasting doctrine should not be applied to cable
television.20 5 The Sloan Commission reasoned that the large number
of channels provided by cable television would result in contrasting
opinions without regulation and that to require cable operators to pro-
vide time for the expression of contrasting viewpoints would discourage
robust news reporting and public affairs programming.20 6
In 1974, the President's Cabinet Committee on Cable Commun-
ications recommended that in the regulation of cable television, the
fairness doctrine, the equal opportunities in political broadcasting doc-
trine, and the program origination requirement be abandoned."°' Fur-
ther, this committee proposed that the requirement that cable operators
provide free channels (one each for government and education, and
one or more for the discussion of public issues) be revoked, with the
possible exception of requiring a single public access channel.20 8 The
chairman of this committee was Dr. Clay T. Whitehead, then the di-
rector of the Office of Telecommunications Policy and adviser to Presi-
205. SLOAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE-
THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 178 (1971).
206. Id. at 92-95, 121-22.
207. THE CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 29, 38, 43 (1974).
208. Id. Congress entrusted regulation of communications to an "independent
agency," the FCC. In the rule making function, such agencies exercise legislative power
which Congress itself might exercise if it had time to fill in the details. Accordingly,
independent agencies are responsible to the Congress rather than to the president. The
seven-member commission, no more than a simple majority of whom may belong to the
same political party, represents a wide segment of the public interest. Procedural safe-
guards are provided to assure that all parties in interest will have an opportunity to be
heard.
During recent years the functions of the Executive Office of the President were in-
creased greatly and power was shifted from the independent agencies to the White
House. The Office of Telecommunications Policy, which advises the president on com-
munications, made studies and recommendations in all areas of the FCC's rule making
and policy making functions. As OTP does not conduct public hearings under the pro-
cedural safeguards applicable to independent agencies, it is able to reach conclusions be-
fore the FCC, abiding by traditional procedural requirements and safeguards, can reach
a decision. The OTP's recommendations are then presented to the press, delivered in
speeches before components of the communications industry, sent to the FCC with the
approval of the president, or proposed to the Congress for enactment of legislation.
The foregoing activities of OTP in all areas of the FCC's competence have under-
mined the concept of the independent agency and subjected regulation of the sensitive
communications journalistic function to domination by the executive branch. For an
analysis of this problem and suggested solution, see Barrow, OTP and FCC: Role of
the Presidency and the Independent Agency in Communications, 43 U. CN. L. Rv.
291 (1974).
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dent Nixon on communications policy. During Dr. Whitehead's direc-
torship, the OTP proposed legislation by the Congress defining the jur-
isdiction and authority of the FCC with regard to cable television.
20 9
The proposed statute would prohibit the FCC or any other govern-
mental agency, federal, state, or local, from applying to cable television
the fairness doctrine, the equal opportunities in political broadcasting
doctrine, and the program origination requirement. The proposal
would also forbid 21° any governmental agency from requiring dedicated
channels, such as those now required by the FCC,211 except one for
public access.
While the number of channels on most existing cable systems is
quite limited, the assumption is that the potential of cable to provide
an unlimited number of channels will be realized in the near future. 
12
Thus, all who desire access to cable, it is asserted, will be granted ac-
209. OTP, DRAFT OF THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1974: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS (1973) ("A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to create a national
policy respecting cable communications"). The OTP proposal has not been introduced
as a bill but negotiations looking toward such a bill having reasonable assurance of en-
actment have been under way for some time. The author has been informed that the
FCC was invited to comment on the proposal and did so.
210. Id. § 709(b).
211. See note 165 & accompanying text supra.
212. The FCC requires a cable capacity, in communities of significant size, of 120
Megahertz. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (1) (1973). A channel on cable television, like an
over-the-air television channel has a bandwidth of 6 Megahertz. The coaxial cable in
general use today carries frequencies between 3 and 270 Megahertz. Arithmetically, the
FCC required cable capacity would carry twenty channels, and the coaxial cable in gen-
eral use would carry forty-four channels. However, several factors reduce the number
of usable channels. The cable operator is required by the FCC to carry "on request
of the relevant station licensee or permittee" all local over-the-air broadcasting signals.
Id. §§ 76.59(a)(1), .61(a)(1) (1973). The difference in time required for a broadcast-
ing signal to reach the same receiver by the over-the-air route and the cable route creates
a "ghost" effecL To avoid this, the over-the-air signals are converted to other frequen-
cies before being transmitted on the cable, and the frequencies on the cable
corresponding with the over-the-air frequencies are avoided. L. JOHNSON, CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DAYTON MIAM VALLEY: SuMmARY REPORT 8 (1972).
If a converter is used on the receiving set, the ghost effect can be avoided
and with improvements in technology these channels can be used. As in broadcasting,
separation between channels must be maintained, and intermodulation and harmonic in-
terference problems, which are aggravated by the necessity of using amplifiers on the
cable, further reduce the number of usable channels. In the existing state of the art
a 270 Megahertz cable can carry between twenty and twenty-five channels. Installing
two cables and a switch on the terminal to change cable connections will double the
number of usable channels. In large metropolitan areas, typically two cables are in-
stalled. In a large percentage of homes the only receiver is a VHF (very high fre-
quency) television receiver. Regardless of the number of channels on the cable, such
a receiver can receive only twelve channels unless a converter is attached to the receiver.
For an up to date description of cable systems, see BAHit, supra note 168, at 1-39.
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cess. Since, unlike broadcasting, there is no limited access problem,
it is argued that there is no need to apply the fairness doctrine, equal
opportunities in political broadcasting doctrine, the program origination
requirement, or the public access channel requirement to cable televi-
sion.
21 3
The Case for Regulation
Freedom of cable television to develop in accordance with the de-
mands of a free market has superficial appeal. It gives the cable op-
erator discretion to develop the content of cable service. However, be-
cause of economic constraints and fragmentation of audience problems,
it is unlikely that the public interest in cable television service will be
served without regulation.
The number of channels in the typical cable television system is
quite limited. 14 The cost of constructing a cable system of high chan-
nel capacity is great and in the present stage of development of cable
television revenue is small.215 When all channels are substantially in
continuous use, the FCC's rules require the cable operator to provide
another channel.2 16 However, to provide one channel after the capac-
ity of the original cable is exhausted requires repeating the laying of
cable and wiring throughout the system. Under existing economic con-
ditions it is highly unlikely that the FCC will enforce this rule.
The FCC has decided that the rates charged by cable operators
should not be set,2 17 as they are in the case of common carriers. Cable
operators may be expected to charge what the traffic will bear. In such
a free trade market, business has a competitive advantage in gaining
access over nonprofit organizations, groups and individuals. Thus rural
areas and low income sections of urban communities may not have ac-
cess to cable systems without a governmental subsidy.
The public access channel which the FCC requires cable operators
to provide is not adequate, by itself, -to serve the purpose of the fairness
doctrine and companion equal opportunities in political broadcasting
doctrine. The public access channel is available on a first-come, first-
213. Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable Television, 11 HARV. J. LEGIs. 629
(1974). For an argument in support of application of the fairness doctrine to cable
television, see Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (1972).
214. See note 212 supra.
215. For a current survey of the economics of cable television, see BAER, supra note
168, at 40-65.
216. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a) (8) (1973).
217. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(iii).
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served basis to any person for any purpose he chooses.218 While such
a "soapbox" channel serves a valuable public interest purpose, it does
not even proximately assure that all meritorious issues will be venti-
lated, that appropriate spokesmen on the issues will gain access, or that
all sides will be presented. If a political candidate uses the channel,
there is no assurance that the opposing candidate can get in line in time
to make an effective response.
In broadcasting, the licensee determines the public issues that de-
serve airing and selects appropriate spokesmen for each side. Political
candidates are granted access for a prompt appearance following that
of their opponents. The public interest demands that some similar sys-
tem of choosing issues for presentation on cable television be formu-
lated. The responsibility might well be placed on the cable operator.
Another approach would be to establish representative local commit-
tees, as discussed previously,2 19 having authority to select the issues
meriting presentation on the dedicated channels. The local committee
should be representative of all significant groups and interests in the
community served. As observed earlier in this article,22 0 such a prac-
tical plan of access to cable television to present contrasting viewpoints
on public issues would meet the Supreme Court's standard and would
not infringe upon the freedom of the press of cable operators. As in
broadcasting, the First Amendment interest of listeners and viewers
must be paramount among the various interests to be accommodated.
Even assuming that cable capacity will reach a level that all who
wish access to cable television can be accommodated, informed public
opinion and a viable political process via cable television may not occur
unless the fairness doctrine and equal opportunities in political broad-
casting doctrine are applied to cable television. Many who have some-
thing meritorious to say do not have the means to purchase time on
the cable. Unless a reasonable number of channels are dedicated with-
out charge for use in discussing public issues, only those who can pay
their way will be heard. Moreover, even those who can pay may find
their message is less effective because of fragmentation of audiences.
In broadcasting, it has been practical to discuss public issues because
the number of channels is small, regular patterns of viewing develop,
and a substantial part of the audience which hear one side of an issue in
a broadcast will be tuned to -the same station when ,the other side is
218. Id. § 76.251 (a) (4).
219. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
220. Id,
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presented in a later broadcast. In cable television, the greater number
of channels may be expected to divide the subscribers into many
smaller audiences. And there is no assurance that even this small
group would be reached by a spokesman seeking to present the other
side of an issue previously communicated over a channel of the cable
system. Similarly, political candidates would reach substantially dif-
ferent audiences. Under these circumstances, people would form their
opinions on issues on the basis of hearing one side and would vote for
political candidates on the basis of hearing only one candidate.
To assure that the people have an opportunity to hear all sides
of public issues and opposing political candidates, it is essential that a
reasonable number of channels be dedicated to the discussion of public
issues and the conduct of political campaigns. As to these channels,
the fairness doctrine and companion equal opportunities in political
broadcasting dootrine should apply. This is contemplated by the FCC's
existing rule, which applies these doctrines only to those channels sub-
ject to program origination and not to the public access channel or to
leased channels.221 Of course, to render the equal opportunities in po-
litical broadcasting doctrine effective in cable television, it may be nec-
essary to limit political campaign appearances to the program origina-
tion channels or to grant the opposing candidates access to the same
channel.
Some may say that broadcasting adequately serves the need for
discussion of public issues and conduct of political campaigns. How-
ever, the potential of cable to provide two-way communication renders
the medium much more effective than broadcasting for participation by
the public in decisionmaking and the political process. Through cable
television it is possible to have town meetings at the local, regional, and
national levels.
It would be most unfortunate if, before cable television has had
a chance to show what it can contribute to the formation of opinion and
the political process, the requirement that cable television serve the
public interest should be abandoned and this revolutionary electronic
medium should be permitted to serve only desires of business. The
enormous potential of cable television to serve the public interest has
been described above.222 In the public interest, the FCC should con-
221. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1973). The FCC wisely required cable operators
to engage in program origination, appreciating that this would tend to develop audience
interest and loyalties much as in broadcasting, and applied the fairness and equal oppor-
tunities doctrines to these channels.
222. See text accompanying notes 164-170 supra.
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tinue to apply to cable television the program origination rule and, as
to channels carrying such program originations, should apply the fair-
ness and equal opportunities doctrines.
Conclusion
The preferred position given to freedom of speech and press
under our Constitution recognizes the importance of the free exchange
of ideas to self-government. Yet the cosmopolitan character of our
people impedes achievement of consensus on solutions to our increas-
ingly complex problems, and our citizens tend to give up the effort to
understand the problems and become discouraged from participation
in decisionmaking. Decisionmaking is thereby entrusted more and
more to an elite.
The mass media have the potential to inform the people and
thereby to encourage their responsible participation in self-government.
However, the mass media are big business, requiring large aggregates
of capital and typically are owned and managed by persons who quite
naturally share and air the point of view of the wealthy end of the eco-
nomic spectrum. Commercial advertising also affects media content.
These tendencies result in neglect of some issues of importance to mid-
dle and low income groups and in the presentation of only one side
of other issues. Consequently, an uninformed people withdraw from
participation in deciding many issues and reach unsound decisions on
others.
In broadcasting, participation of the people in decisionmaking and
the political process is encouraged through governmental regulation.
The fairness doctrine requires licensed broadcasters to allocate reason-
able time for the presentation of public issues and to present all sides
of such issues. Political candidates must be given equal opportunities
in the use of broadcasting facilities for political purposes. Broadcasters
are obliged-under a standard of reasonableness-to fulfill the pro-
gram needs of the community, resulting in a degree of diversity of pro-
gramming serving civic, social, and cultural needs. The Supreme Court
has held that such regulation of broadcasting in the public interest does
not violate the freedom of press of the licensed broadcasters. The
basis for this conclusion is two-fold. First, the number of broadcasting
channels is limited by the natural characteristics of the radio spectrum
so that not all who wish to broadcast can be accommodated. Second,
freedom of speech and press in broadcasting involves interests of the
broadcasters, those desiring access to the facilities, and the listeners and
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viewers; in the balancing of these interests that of the latter is para-
mount.
The print media, on the other hand, have been declared by the
Supreme Court to be free from governmental regulation of the content
published. Thus, a requirement by government that a newspaper grant
a right of reply to a political candidate whose character has been per-
sonally attacked during a campaign is an unconstitutional infringement
of the freedom of press of the print media. Further, on First Amend-
ment grounds, the Supreme Court has substantially immunized the
print media from liability for false defamation against political candi-
dates and public officials or figures.
Economic limitations on the number of daily newspapers have re-
sulted in heavier concentration of local newspaper ownership than of
local broadcasting stations. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has re-
fused to equate the economic limitation of the print media with the nat-
ural limitation of broadcasting. Moreover, the Court has refused to ex-
tend to the print media the concept utilized in its broadcasting decisions
that viewers and listeners hold the paramount position in the accommo-
dation of the various First Amendment interests. The Supreme Court
gives no weight to the interest of readers of a newspaper in being in-
formed, rather than misinformed, on public issues and the qualifications
of political candidates. The capsheaf on our societal values is the polit-
ical process and decision of public issues. The Supreme Court's view
of freedom of press as absolute leaves the electorate at the mercy of
the print media. It is submitted that the Supreme Court could have
required daily newspapers to grant a right of reply to political candi-
dates whose character is attacked during a campaign without eroding
any of the values on which freedom of press and speech are based.
Nevertheless, valid distinctions can be drawn between broadcast-
ing and the print media for purposes of governmental regulation in the
interest of the need of the people to know. Natural limitation of the
radio spectrum is distinguishable from economic limitation. The radio
channels are owned by the people, while the print media own their
presses. The development of nationwide broadcasting networks
largely limits national and international news and opinion to three
sources-the ABC, CBS and NBC networks. As highly concentrated
as daily newspaper ownership is, the sources of national and interna-
tional news and opinion are relatively numerous.
The freedom of the print media should be celebrated with journal-
istic responsibility. Voluntary policies of granting access for viewpoints
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opposed to the newspaper's editorial point of view and for reply to per-
sonal attack should be adopted. Management could be aided in admin-
istering such policies by a committee of citizens representative of the
community.
Potentially, cable television can serve the need of the people to
know far better than can broadcasting or the print media. Two way
communication by cable television makes possible the restoration of the
town meeting and the establishment of state, regional, and national
meetings of the people. The FCC's rules governing cable television
took account of this potential to fulfill the people's need to know.
Cable operators were required to provide public access channels, to
originate programming, and, on the program origination channels, to
comply with the fairness doctrine and the equal opportunities in polit-
ical broadcasting doctrine-in -the same way that these doctrines had
been applied in broadcasting. While the issue of freedom of speech
and press has not been considered by the Supreme Court in cable tele-
vision, it is clear that the rules do not violate the First Amendment.
Although applying the fairness doctrine and related doctrines to
cable television does not violate the cable operators' freedom of the
press, a strong movement is under way to prohibit any governmental
agency from requiring cable operators (1) to present both sides of con-
troversial issues which are communicated over program origination
channels, (2) to grant equal opportunities to opposing political candi-
dates, (3) to originate programming, or (4) to provide a free access
channel to government or education. Under the proposed policy, the
cable operator could only be required to provide one free soapbox
channel. If the current policy move is successful, cable television will
be limited to serving business, professional, entertainment, and other
profit-making institutions.
This limited use would waste a valuable asset. Cable television
should not only provide opportunity for profit, but also serve the need
of the people to know. Potentially cable television provides a means
of communication of far greater capacity to inform the people than
broadcasting or the print media. Cable television may provide our last
chance to fulfill the need of the people to know. Unless advantage
is taken of this opportunity, our society may lose the race between edu-
cation and catastrophe. The policy of Congress and the FCC should
Author's Note: Recently, the FCC abandoned its requirement that cable television
operators originate programming. Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Program Origination by Cable Television
January 1975]
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further the larger and more effective use of cable television in the pub-
lic interest of self-government.
Systems, Docket No. 19988, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 123. Since the program
origination rule had been suspended since the early 1970's, this action by the FCC is
merely formal recognition of ongoing policy. See note 181 supra. The arguments set
forth in this article are not changed by this development, however unfortunate it may
be. See text accompanying notes 197-200 supra.
